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PUNISHMENT WITHOUT PURPOSE:   
THE RETRIBUTIVE AND UTILITARIAN FAILURES 
OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY NON-
PRODUCTION SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
BRITTANY N. LOWE* 
ABSTRACT 
Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress established the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission to formulate an empirical set of federal sentencing 
Guidelines. With the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Congress intended to further the 
basic purposes of criminal punishment—deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, 
and rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the Guidelines were instantaneously met with 
disapproval. Asserting that the mandatory Guidelines violated the Constitution, 
scholars and judges argued that the Commission usurped Congress’s role by 
prescribing punishments that were essentially binding law. In 2005, the Supreme 
Court held that the Guidelines were discretionary in United States v. Booker.  While 
this decision resolved many of the issues associated with the Guidelines, it arguably 
made matters worse with respect to the child pornography non-production 
Guidelines. The child pornography non-production Guidelines have been widely 
criticized for lacking a connection to community values, leaving little room for 
rehabilitation, and being excessively harsh. Thus, district courts often elect to deviate 
from the problematic Guidelines in an attempt to impose a fair sentence.  However, 
because district courts are free to deviate from the Guidelines at the discretion of the 
judge, the sentencing system has become inconsistent and unpredictable. In addition, 
courts often impose punishment for morally repugnant crimes that is too lenient. As 
a result, the child pornography non-production Guidelines do not further the basic 
theories of criminal punishment in the United States—retributivism and 
utilitarianism. In order to prevent the sexual exploitation of children and restore 
consistency in federal sentencing law, the Guidelines system must be systematically 
reformed.    
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUE PRESENTED BY THE POST-BOOKER GUIDELINES 
In 2011, Ryan Collins stood before U.S. District Judge James Gwin in Cleveland, 
Ohio, and awaited his sentence.1 Collins was thirty-two years old at the time of his 
sentencing and had no criminal history. Nevertheless, the crime he faced was 
significant. Months earlier, a jury convicted Collins of one count possessing, 
distributing, and receiving child pornography and one count possession of child 
pornography.2 Throughout the course of their investigation into Collins’ addiction, 
law enforcement officers found over 1,500 illegal files on his computer.3 
                                                          
 1  Eric Heisig, Cleveland Federal Judge’s Five-Year Sentence in Child Porn Case Frustrates 
Prosecutor, CLEVELAND.COM  (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.cleveland.com/court-
justice/index.ssf/2015/02/cleveland_federal_judge_hands.html (discussing the controversy 
surrounding Judge Gwin’s decision to deviate from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines); see also Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Judge Polls Jurors and Issues 5-Year Sentence in Child Porn Case; 6th Circuit 
Dissent Cited, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 11, 2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_polls_jurors_and_issues_five_year_sentence_in_chi
ld_porn_case_6th_cir/ (explaining the basis for Judge Gwin’s significant downward departure). 
 2  Heisig, supra note 1. 
 3  Id. 
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After evaluating the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines4 for Collins, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office and U.S. Department of Probation and Pretrial Services recommended 
between twenty-one and twenty-seven years in federal prison.5 If this sentence were 
imposed, Collins would be a middle-aged man when he was released. Contrary to 
the Government’s recommendation, however, Judge Gwin handed down a five-year 
sentence—the minimum allowable imprisonment for a child pornography 
distribution charge.6 Judge Gwin’s decision, which has become the center of a 
nationwide controversy, was based on a jury poll about potential sentences.7 In stark 
contrast to the twenty-one to twenty-seven years outlined in the Guidelines, the jury 
recommended—on average—a mere fourteen months of imprisonment.8 
Without question, any crime relating to possessing or distributing child 
pornography is morally repugnant. The sexual exploitation of children is 
unjustifiable, and offenders should be punished for their crimes. In an attempt to 
formulate just punishments, Congress has set out penalties for child pornography 
offenders through the promulgation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The 
Guidelines, implemented through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,9 reflect 
Congress’s attempt to create a uniform and empirical system of punishment.10 In 
recent years, however, the Guidelines have proven ineffective.   
In 2005, the Supreme Court determined that the Guidelines are merely advisory 
in United States v. Booker.11 As a result, district courts are free to deviate from the 
                                                          
 4  U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 2016), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2016/GLMFull.pdf [hereinafter 
USSG].   
 5  Heisig, supra note 1. 
 6  Id. 
 7  See Judge James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 186–87 
(2010) (detailing the jury questionnaire process and the disparity between the Guidelines and 
community values); Jacob Sullum, Judges Find Federal Child Porn Sentences Are Much 
Longer Than Jurors Consider Just, REASON MAG. (Feb. 23, 2015), 
https://reason.com/blog/2015/02/23/judges-find-federal-child-porn-sentences (discussing 
Judge Gwin’s approach to sentencing Collins).    
 8  Gwin, supra note 7, at 186–87. Following Judge Gwin’s downward variance, the 
Government reiterated its objection to the variance based on the jury poll. See United States v. 
Collins, 828 F.3d 386, 387 (6th Cir. June 29, 2016). Thereafter, the Government appealed, 
challenging Judge Gwin’s “use of the jury poll and his alleged failure to adequately consider 
deterrence as a sentencing factor.” Id. at 388. In June 2016, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Judge 
Gwin’s downward variance, finding that Judge Gwin’s use of a jury poll after the verdict “as 
one factor in formulating defendant’s sentence did not conflate the respective duties of judge 
and jury.” Id. at 389. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit recognized that juries “can provide insight 
into the community’s view of the gravity of an offense.” Id. at 390. Therefore, the court held 
that Collins’ sentence was not unreasonable. Id.  
 9  Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 10  USSG Ch.5, Pt.A, intro.  
 11  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005). It should be noted that Booker 
found the entirety of the Guidelines—not just the child pornography provisions—to be merely 
advisory. 
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Guidelines at the discretion of the judge. In some instances, this may be justifiable, 
as the child pornography sentences prescribed by the Guidelines are not appropriate 
in all cases.12 In fact, the Guidelines have been widely criticized for several reasons. 
For instance, the Guidelines are excessively harsh, leave little room for 
rehabilitation, and—as indicated by Judge Gwin’s jury polling study—lack a 
connection to community values. On the other hand, deviations from the Guidelines 
are not desirable when district courts impose sentences that are too lenient. In any 
case, because the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, the sentencing system is 
unpredictable and not always fair to similarly situated defendants. 
Moreover, inconsistent sentencing in child pornography cases does not promote 
the basic theories of punishment that the United States recognizes. For centuries, 
philosophers and legal scholars have discussed the purposes of punishment. A 
fundamental principle of the criminal justice system holds that punishment should 
serve a greater good and balance the moral order of society. Recognizing this 
philosophy, the Guidelines acknowledge the two competing theories of 
punishment—retributivism and utilitarianism—and consider them in creating 
sentencing policies.13 Nevertheless, the inconsistent application of the child 
pornography Guidelines defeats the purpose of such goals and produces no results to 
better the criminal justice system. In the world of child pornography, the justice 
system does not seem “just” at all. 
This Note examines the ineffectiveness of the child pornography non-production 
Guidelines. Because of the various issues associated with the Guidelines, federal 
district courts often decline to follow them and instead impose vastly inconsistent 
punishments for defendants convicted of similar crimes.14 These unpredictable 
sentences do not promote retributive and utilitarian values. Thus, this Note argues 
that reform is necessary. The Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides 
background information about the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines, highlighting the penalties for child pornography non-
production offenses. In addition, Part II examines retributivism and utilitarianism, 
detailing the goals that these theories aim to achieve. Part III analyzes the issues 
associated with the Guidelines and argues that these flaws invite federal judges to 
impose case-by-case punishments. Part III then asserts that such inconsistent 
punishment does not serve retributive and utilitarian goals. Part IV proposes a 
comprehensive reform of the non-production Guidelines. Finally, Part V offers a 
brief conclusion. 
                                                          
 12  For a detailed discussion of the child pornography Guidelines, see infra Part II(A)(2). 
Child pornography non-production offenses are governed by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 
2G2.2. 
 13  USSG Ch.5, Pt.A, intro.  
 14  See generally Loren Rigsby, Comment, A Call for Judicial Scrutiny: How Increased 
Judicial Discretion Has Led to Disparity and Unpredictability in Federal Sentencings for 
Child Pornography, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1319 (2010) (discussing the unpredictable 
sentences for child pornography offenders due to frequent deviations from the Guidelines). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/8
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II. BACKGROUND:  SENTENCING REFORM AND THE THEORIES OF JUST PUNISHMENT 
A. Sentencing Reform in the United States 
1. A Brief History of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Development of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the justice system 
faced a number of serious problems. Unlimited judicial discretion in sentencing 
caused unpredictability for criminal defendants.15 Furthermore, legal scholars and 
federal judges criticized the justice system’s focus on rehabilitation as the primary 
form of criminal punishment.16 Although such a system allowed for the 
individualized treatment of criminal defendants, the judicial discretion also led to a 
disparity in sentencing that did little to deter future crime and protect the general 
public.17 After years of research and debate, Congress implemented a 
comprehensive, national solution. 
With the Sentencing Reform Act provisions of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984, Congress created a permanent Commission charged with the 
ongoing responsibilities of recommending appropriate sentences and establishing a 
research and development program.18 The primary purpose of the Commission was 
to reduce sentencing disparities and achieve a more honest criminal justice system.19 
In light of its unique goals, Congress established the U.S. Sentencing Commission as 
a bipartisan, independent agency in the judicial branch of government.20 Its staff of 
100 is divided into five offices, including General Counsel, Education and 
Sentencing Practice, Research and Data, Legislative and Public Affairs, and 
Administration.21 In terms of general management, the Commission is comprised of 
seven voting members, three of whom must be federal judges.22 The commissioners, 
who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, serve six-year 
terms.23 In 1987, the newly-created Commission promulgated its first set of 
Guidelines in order to meet the aims of the Sentencing Reform Act.24 In theory, the 
                                                          
 15  An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
http://isb.ussc.gov/files/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2015) [hereinafter An 
Overview]; see also The United States Sentencing Commission in Focus, U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/In-Focus_About.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2015). 
 16  Gwin, supra note 7, at 178- 79. 
 17  Id. 
 18  An Overview, supra note 15. 
 19  Gwin, supra note 7, at 179. 
 20  An Overview, supra note 15. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (delegating the task of formulating the Guidelines to 
the Commission); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law 
Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1991) 
(discussing the delegation of policymaking authority to the Commission). 
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Guidelines delineate a sentencing range for a defendant based on the seriousness of 
the criminal conduct and the defendant’s prior record.25 In light of this empirical 
analysis, the Guidelines assign each federal crime a numerical “offense level” and 
place offenders in the appropriate “criminal history category.”26 The point at which 
the offense level and criminal history category intersect contains a range for 
sentencing.27 
Unfortunately, the Guidelines were met almost instantaneously with disapproval. 
Critics argued that the Guidelines violated constitutional principles by empowering 
the Commission to essentially make law in prescribing the punishment for criminal 
defendants.28 Contrary to the fundamental principle that “[a]ll legislative powers . . . 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,” the Commission was a legislative 
body that created binding federal law.29 In addition to usurping Congress’s 
legislative powers, the Commission also lacked a direct line of accountability to any 
of the three branches of government.30 Despite attempts to create a bipartisan, 
independent agency, the Commission was inherently politicized.31 Its powers went 
largely unchecked—a regime that ran directly contrary to the checks and balances 
form of government that the Framers of the Constitution intended. 
In 2005, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision to resolve the 
constitutional problems associated with the Guidelines. In United States v. Booker, 
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.32 Pursuant to Booker, district courts, “while not bound to 
apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account 
when sentencing.”33 Furthermore, the Supreme Court mandated that circuit courts 
review any departures from the Guidelines under a “reasonableness” standard.34 
Thus, the Commission was no longer acting as a legislative body, but merely 
promulgating rules from which federal judges could easily deviate. Independent 
sentencing factors could therefore be taken into consideration under the Booker 
regime. Undoubtedly, this monumental decision allowed federal judges to return to 
individualized sentencing—something thought to have been eliminated by the 
Sentencing Reform Act. However, while Booker quieted many of the constitutional 
                                                          
 25  Wright, supra note 24, at 11. 
 26  Id. at 64. 
 27  Id. at 62 n.281. 
 28  For a discussion of the constitutional arguments against the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the majority’s decision to uphold the Guidelines condoned a “new Branch” of 
government and violated basic constitutional principles); Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A 
Critique of Federal Sentencing, 458 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 6 (2002), 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa458.pdf. 
 29  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 30  Luna, supra note 28, at 6. 
 31  Id. 
 32  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243 (2005). 
 33  Id. at 264 (emphasis added).  
 34  Id. 
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arguments against the Guidelines, the decision ultimately did little to resolve the 
inconsistency in federal sentencing. 
2. A Summary of the Child Pornography Non-Production Guidelines and 
Accompanying Sentencing Enhancements 
In the context of child pornography non-production offenses, the Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in Booker arguably worsened the existing problems of 
federal sentencing law.  In a criminal justice system in which judges inconsistently 
apply the Guidelines on a case-by-case basis, disparity in sentencing has again 
become a serious issue.35 When confronted with child pornography offenders who 
have committed non-production offenses, federal judges have shown little deference 
to the Guidelines.36 In addition, under the “reasonableness” standard set forth by 
Booker, appellate courts often overturn arbitrary departures from the Guidelines and 
impose varying terms of imprisonment.37 Such rulings are detrimental to the 
predictability and consistency of sentencing that Congress intended when creating 
the Commission. Furthermore, countless appeals have wasted judicial resources and 
reflect poorly on the judiciary as a whole. As a result, it is arguable that federal 
sentencing law has regressed rather than progressed. 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2G2.2 governs child pornography non-production 
offenses. Because this particular section lacks a connection to community values, 
leaves little room for rehabilitation, and is harsh, § 2G2.2 has become one of the 
most frequently litigated Guidelines in the federal sentencing system.38 Scholars and 
judges contend that § 2G2.2 contains excessive sentencing ranges that are driven by 
                                                          
 35  See Judge Brendan J. Sheehan, Courts Caught in the Web: Fixing a Failed System with 
Factors Designed for Sentencing Child Pornography Offenders, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 799, 
801–04 (2015) (highlighting the disparity in sentencing for child pornography offenders with 
two particular Ohio cases); see also Stephanie Francis Ward, Courts Are Giving Reduced 
Terms to Many Child-Porn Defendants, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 1, 2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/courts_are_giving_reduced_terms_to_many_chil
d_porn_defendants (discussing judges’ decisions to depart from the Guidelines in sentencing 
child pornography offenders). 
 36  Sheehan, supra note 35, at 801–04; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review 
of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 731 (2009) (“A 
number of district courts have concluded ‘that the child pornography guidelines’ lack of 
empirical support provides sentencing judges the discretion to sentence below those guidelines 
based on policy disagreements with them.’”) (quoting United States v. Huffstatler, 561 F.3d 
694, 697 (7th Cir. 2009)).   
 37  Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. Under Booker, appellate courts must review decisions to 
deviate from the Guidelines under a “reasonableness” standard, which has both a procedural 
and substantive component. Id. 
 38  See System Has Gone Overboard With Child Porn Sentences, TIMESNEWS (July 16, 
2015), http://www.timesnews.net/News/2015/07/16/System-has-gone-overboard-with-child-
porn-sentences.html [hereinafter System Has Gone Overboard] (discussing a recent case in 
which a child pornography offender received a 520-year sentence); Troy Stabenow, A Method 
for Careful Study: A Proposal for Reforming the Child Pornography Guidelines, 24 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 108, 114 (2011).  
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politics and partisanship rather than justice and empirical evidence.39 In fact, 
according to a survey conducted by the Commission, most federal judges think child 
pornography sentences are too long.40 This problem is particularly disturbing with 
respect to non-production offenses.41 Non-production offenses, which are governed 
by § 2G2.2, include the simple possession of child pornography.42 Child 
pornography is defined as: 
[A]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture or 
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or 
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit 
conduct, where—  
 
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;  
(B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or 
computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of 
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or 
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to 
appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.43 
The simple possession of such materials subjects a defendant to a statutory 
penalty range of zero to ten years of imprisonment.44 However, if the offender has a 
prior conviction for a covered sex offense, the penalty range increases to ten to 
twenty years of imprisonment.45 While the Guidelines provide a numerical base level 
of “eighteen” for possession of child pornography, there are several specific offense 
characteristics that may increase this level, including the age of the child involved, 
use of a computer or the Internet, and the nature of the acts depicted in the images.46 
                                                          
 39  An Introduction to Child Pornography Sentencing, FAMM, http://famm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/FS-Intro-to-Child-Porn-8.22.13-fixed.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 
2015). 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. The relevant survey reveals that approximately 70% of judges think that the 
sentences for possession of child pornography are too high. Id. 
 42  USSG § 2G2.2 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A, 2252, 2252A(a)–(b), and 2260(b) (2016)). 
 43  18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2012). 
 44  See Analysis of Child Pornography Offenses, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 106 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-
reports/2012-booker/Part_C11_Child_Pornography_Offenses.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2015). 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 107. The comprehensive list of specific offense characteristics that increase 
sentences in child pornography cases includes the following: 
(3) (Apply the greatest) If the offense involved: 
(A) Distribution for pecuniary gain, increase by the number of levels 
from the table in § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and 
Fraud) corresponding to the retail value of the material, but by 
not less than 5 levels.(B) Distribution for the receipt, or 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/8
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Under the current regime of § 2G2.2, years of imprisonment are almost inevitable for 
most non-production offenders. 
District courts have responded to this harshness by deviating from the 
Guidelines. In recent years, both government and non-government sponsored below-
range sentences have increased substantially.47 In 2010 alone, less than 55% of child 
pornography sentences fell within the Guidelines range.48 Because district courts 
refuse to adhere to the harsh penalties prescribed by the Guidelines, they continue to 
impose inconsistent punishments on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately, sentences for 
similarly situated defendants are markedly different, deterrence goals are futile, and 
the sexual exploitation of children continues. In light of this data, it is questionable 
as to whether the Guidelines have truly achieved a just system of punishment. In 
fact, the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act seem to have been thwarted. 
B. The Theories of Just Punishment in the Criminal Justice System 
For centuries, societies around the world have justified criminal punishment 
based on a number of theories, most of which have been retributive or utilitarian in 
nature.49 Scholars and philosophers have argued that criminal punishment should 
                                                                                                                                         
expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary 
gain, increase by 5 levels. 
(B) Distribution to a minor, increase by 5 levels. 
(C) Distribution to a minor that was intended to persuade, induce, 
entice, or coerce the minor to engage in any illegal activity 
covered under subdivision (E), increase by 6 levels.  
(D) Distribution to a minor that was intended to persuade, induce, 
entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, the minor to engage in 
prohibited sexual conduct, increase by 7 levels.  
(E) Distribution other than distribution described in subdivisions (A) 
through (E), increase by 2 levels. 
(4) If the offense involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic 
conduct or other depictions of violence, increase by 4 levels. 
(5) If the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse 
or exploitation of a minor, increase by 5 levels.  
(6) If the offense involved the use of a computer or an interactive computer 
service for the possession, transmission, receipt, or distribution of the 
material, or for accessing with intent to view the material, increase by 2 
levels.   
(7) If the offense involved— 
(A) at least 10 images, but fewer than 150, increase by 2 levels; 
(B) at least 150 images, but fewer than 300, increase by 3 levels;  
(C) at least 300 images, but fewer than 600, increase by 4 levels; and  
(D) 600 or more images, increase by 5 levels. 
See USSG § 2G2.2(b). 
 47  Analysis of Child Pornography Offenses, supra note 44, at 196–209. 
 48  An Introduction to Child Pornography Sentencing, supra note 39. 
 49  See Robert B. McCaleb, Rejustifying Retributive Punishment on Utilitarian Grounds in 
Light of Neuroscientific Discoveries: More Than Philosophical Calisthenics!, 63 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 515, 522 (2015) (noting that the two key theories of punishment are retributivism and 
utilitarianism).   
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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serve a purpose.50 The Guidelines purport to further this goal. Under the Sentencing 
Reform Act,51 the Commission is charged with developing Guidelines that “further 
the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just 
punishment, and rehabilitation.”52 Nevertheless, the Guidelines ultimately fail to 
promote the theories of just punishment in the context of child pornography non-
production offenses.53 Because federal judges often deviate from the flawed non-
production Guidelines, sentences have become extremely unpredictable. Such 
inconsistent punishment does not serve retributive or utilitarian purposes. In order to 
fully understand the effect of the Guidelines’ inconsistent application, it is necessary 
to examine the underlying principles of the retributive and utilitarian theories of 
punishment. 
1. Retributivism 
A backward-looking theory of criminal punishment, retributivism originated with 
Immanuel Kant’s famous philosophy that morally culpable individuals deserve 
punishment.54 This idea is epitomized by Kant’s argument that an island society on 
the verge of disbanding should still execute its last remaining murderer.55 According 
to retributivists, proportionate punishment restores the moral order that has been 
breached by the criminal act.56 Society is obligated to ensure such a balance, and 
failure to punish blameworthy individuals leaves guilt upon the society.57 As a result, 
the retributive theory presupposes that people are responsible moral agents who are 
capable of freely choosing between right and wrong.58 Retributivism thus requires 
                                                          
 50  For a discussion of the purposes of criminal punishment, see MICHAEL MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME:  A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & 
JULES COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (1984). 
 51  See supra Part II(A)(1) for a discussion of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 
 52  USSG Ch.1, Pt.A, intro.  
 53  See infra Part III for a detailed analysis of the ways in which the Guidelines fail to 
promote the theories of just punishment. 
 54  For a historical discussion of retributivism and its justifications for criminal 
punishment, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary 
Gregor & Jens Timmermann eds., 2012) (1785). 
 55  See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (1983). For 
a vivid illustration of Kant’s “island” argument, see DIANE MORGAN, KANT TROUBLE: 
OBSCURITIES OF THE ENLIGHTENED 89 (2000): 
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all of its members (e.g., 
if a people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse throughout the 
world), the last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be executed, so that 
each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to the 
people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can be 
regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice. 
 56  Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 347. 
 57  Id.   
 58  Id. at 348. 
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some notion of free will that attributes the responsibility for wrongdoing to criminal 
deviants—a principle that is incompatible with notions of determinism.59 
Despite its strength as a philosophical theory, retributivism has been subject to 
much criticism. For one, critics argue, it is difficult—if not impossible—to judge 
with confidence the moral guilt of others.60 In the same vein, religious doctrines have 
suggested that measuring an offender’s moral culpability is beyond human capacity 
and therefore an inappropriate human purpose.61 Furthermore, it is arguable that the 
notion of an offender “deserving” punishment is somewhat incoherent. Although 
retributivists may assert that punishment is a legitimate public service, retributivism 
does not provide a comprehensive purpose for the infliction of pain and 
punishment.62 The theory instead focuses on just deserts and retribution, essentially 
proposing that punishment is simply the right thing to do. In light of these criticisms, 
some philosophers and scholars hesitate to support retributivism in modern society.63 
Nevertheless, the Guidelines purport to further retributive goals, focusing on the 
severity of the offense in lieu of other considerations, including the mental or 
physical condition, educational skills, experience, or age of the offender.64 In an 
attempt to depart from the inconsistent system of the past, the Guidelines are 
empirical in nature and punish largely based on the seriousness of the offense. 
Moreover, they categorize previous offenders as inherently more culpable by 
prioritizing the defendant’s criminal history among aggravating sentencing factors.65 
These considerations are largely retributive in nature and remain subject to criticism 
and debate among legal scholars and federal judges. In fact, for those who 
acknowledge a justification for punishment beyond mere deserts, retributivism is 
indefensible.66   
2. Utilitarianism 
Several of the most harmful criticisms of retributivism are solved by the 
utilitarian theory of punishment. Contrary to the backward-looking theory of 
retributivism, utilitarianism is a forward-looking philosophy that seeks to justify 
                                                          
 59  Id. Determinists suggest that an individual’s actions are consequences of preceding 
causes over which he or she ultimately has no control. Id. For further information on the 
connection between determinism and moral responsibility, see McCaleb, supra note 49 
(discussing determinism in the context of new developments in neuroscience); Arthur Pap, 
Determinism and Moral Responsibility, 43 J. PHIL. 318 (1946). 
 60  Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 348. 
 61  Id. at 349; see also Mark A. Michael, Utilitarianism and Retributivism: What’s the 
Difference?, 29 AM. PHIL. Q. 173, 175 (1992) (explaining the tenets of the retributivist and 
utilitarian theories of just punishment, their differences, and the criticisms associated with 
them). 
 62  Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 349. 
 63  But see Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism be Saved?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 309 (2014). 
 64  Gwin, supra note 7, at 181. 
 65  Id. 
 66  For a general moral critique of retributivism, see generally James Q. Whitman, A Plea 
Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (2003). 
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punishment based on its good consequences.67 According to utilitarians, a justified 
system of punishment is one that brings about the greatest net benefit to society.68 
Perhaps most important to utilitarianism, however, is the principle of deterrence: 
Knowledge that punishment will follow crime deters people from 
committing crimes, thus reducing future violations of right and the 
unhappiness and insecurity they would cause. The person who has already 
committed a crime cannot, of course, be deterred from committing that 
crime, but his punishment may help to deter others . . . With a properly 
developed penal code, the benefits to be gained from criminal activity 
would be outweighed by the harms of punishment, even when those 
harms were discounted by the probability of avoiding detection. 
Accordingly, the greater the temptation to commit a particular crime and 
the smaller the chance of detection, the more severe the penalty should 
be.69 
This principle—called “general deterrence”—drives utilitarianism and its 
variations.70 In addition to general deterrence, proponents of utilitarianism argue that 
the imposition of consistent punishment serves the purpose of “individual 
deterrence” as well.71 To deter an offender from repeating his or her own criminal 
act, the punishment should be severe enough to outweigh the benefits of the crime.72 
Rather than punish the offender solely as a result of the wrongdoing itself, 
utilitarianism seeks to impose a punishment that will result in the greatest net benefit 
to all parties involved. 
Like retributivism, however, this theory has been subject to a great deal of 
criticism. First, utilitarianism presupposes that general and individual deterrence are 
effective. Numerous empirical studies suggest that they are not.73 While 
utilitarianism requires that imprisonment and punishment will deter future offenders, 
research indicates that imprisonment—along with increasing the severity of 
punishment—deters crime only moderately.74 In addition, individual deterrence 
presupposes that offenders weigh the costs and benefits of their crimes before 
acting—which seems to be a somewhat dubious concept. Beyond the practical 
arguments against utilitarianism, however, are the philosophical objections to the 
                                                          
 67  Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 350. For a thorough, historical discussion of 
utilitarianism, see generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Oxford 1907). 
 68  Michael, supra note 61, at 174. 
 69  Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 351.   
 70  Michael, supra note 61, at 175. 
 71  Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 352. 
 72  Id. 
 73  The effectiveness of criminal deterrence has been questioned by several legal scholars 
and behavioral scientists. For example, for a comprehensive investigation of the effectiveness 
of criminal deterrence, see Dieter Dölling, Is Deterrence Effective? Results of a Meta-Analysis 
of Punishment, 15 EUR. J. CRIM. POL’Y & RES. (2009). 
 74  See Five Things About Deterrence, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (June 6, 2016), 
http://www.nij.gov/five-things/pages/deterrence.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2015). 
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theory. The most fundamental objection is to treating the offender as a means to 
satisfy social purposes rather than an end in himself.75 Because utilitarians believe 
that the main purpose of punishment is to provide a net benefit to society, they may 
punish even the innocent in order to achieve this goal.76 Although proponents of 
utilitarianism likely see retributivism as morally repugnant, it is arguable that they, 
too, would permit practices that society has difficulty accepting.  
3. Mixed Theory of Just Punishment 
Given the flaws of retributivism and utilitarianism, legal scholars and 
philosophers have created a hybrid form of punishment that implements elements of 
both theories. This “mixed theory” justifies punishment with utilitarian principles 
but uses notions of retributivism in order to impose more stringent constraints on 
punishment than pure utilitarianism would allow.77 In its focus on deserts, the mixed 
theory suggests that no offender should be punished more severely than could be 
justified by utilitarian objectives and the degree of the offender’s wrongdoing.78  As 
mixed theorists explain, 
[t]he basic reasons for having compulsory legal rules backed by sanctions 
are utilitarian; these reasons should dominate decisions about the sorts of 
behavior to be made criminal. Moral wrongs should not be subject to legal 
punishment unless that is socially useful, and behavior that is initially 
morally indifferent may be covered by the criminal law if doing so serves 
social goals. Notions of deserts, however, should impose more-stringent 
constraints on the imposition of punishment than pure utilitarianism 
acknowledges.79 
Nevertheless, in terms of offenders whose mental conditions make them less 
blameworthy—but also less amenable to deterrence or rehabilitation—mixed 
theorists would likely support a disproportionate penalty.80 In a perfect world, such 
offenders might be given a moderate sentence and an extended form of treatment. In 
fact, a reformist position argues that the length of sentence for criminal punishment 
should depend more on the rate of rehabilitative progress than the severity of the 
offense.81 Despite these positions, the mixed theory has not fully implemented a 
reform and treatment plan.82 
                                                          
 75  Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 353. 
 76  Id.; see also Michael, supra note 61, at 176 (discussing the charge that “utilitarianism 
sanctions the punishment of innocent persons”). 
 77  Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 354–55. 
 78  Id. at 355. 
 79  Id. at 345–55. 
 80  Id. at 355. 
 81  Id. at 358. This position is similar to arguments for civil commitment, which is 
discussed infra Part IV(C). 
 82  A comprehensive proposal to reform the Guidelines in the context of child pornography 
non-production offenses sentencing law is provided infra Part IV. 
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In terms of the criminal law, the retributive and utilitarian theories largely unite. 
In fact, it is a type of mixed theory that the Guidelines acknowledge in their attempt 
to further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: “deterrence, incapacitation, just 
punishment, and rehabilitation.”83 While the Guidelines’ focus on offense severity is 
retributive in nature, the Commission is also charged with advising and assisting 
Congress in the “development of effective and efficient crime policy,” which 
inevitably involves deterrence.84  In light of the justice system’s inadequacies prior to 
the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act, the Guidelines are designed to promote 
both retributive and utilitarian goals. However, it remains to be seen whether they 
are particularly effective in doing so. 
III. DISCUSSION: THE RETRIBUTIVE AND UTILITARIAN FAILURES OF THE CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY NON-PRODUCTION GUIDELINES 
On their face, the Guidelines appear to be an appropriate result of the Sentencing 
Reform Act. The Guidelines’ empirical structure reflects Congress’s desire to avoid 
judicial discretion and promote a more uniform system of punishment.85 This may 
have been effective before the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker. After Booker, 
however, district courts are free to deviate from the Guidelines. Because the child 
pornography non-production Guidelines lack a connection to community values, 
leave little room for rehabilitation, and are harsh, federal judges frequently exercise 
this option. Deviation from the Guidelines may be appropriate in some instances. In 
other cases, however, district courts impose sentences that are entirely too lenient. 
As a result, similarly situated offenders often receive very different sentences, 
creating inconsistency.86 Neither retributive nor utilitarian goals are served when 
punishment varies on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the sexual exploitation and 
victimization of young children continues. Thus, in order to promote a criminal 
justice system in which punishment serves a purpose, reform is necessary.  
A. The Inadequacies of the Child Pornography Non-Production Guidelines 
1. Factors Contributing to District Courts’ Deviations from the Guidelines 
In order to fully understand district courts’ decisions not to apply the 
Guidelines—and the inconsistency that follows—it is first necessary to analyze the 
issues associated with the Guidelines, including lack of connection to community 
values, inadequate focus on rehabilitation, and harshness. These flaws motivate 
federal judges to impose punishments at their own discretion rather than adhere to 
the Guidelines range. First, the current Guidelines lack a connection to community 
values. Although the Sentencing Reform Act intended to create an honest criminal 
justice system, the Guidelines arguably upset this balance in the context of child 
pornography non-production offenses. In fact, Judge Gwin’s jury polling study is 
telling—the punishment suggested for non-production offenders is not what society 
thinks is just.87 As a result of this disparity, judges often deviate from the Guidelines 
                                                          
 83  USSG Ch.1, Pt.A. 
 84  An Overview, supra note 15. 
 85  Gwin, supra note 7, at 179-80. 
 86  See System Has Gone Overboard, supra note 38. 
 87  Gwin, supra note 7, at 187. 
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in an attempt to impose a fair—yet unpredictable—punishment. Unfortunately, 
Judge Gwin’s 2011 case is not an anomaly. Judge Gwin describes an additional Ohio 
case in which the average recommended sentence was severely disproportionate to 
the Guidelines range: 
In 2007, a jury found Daniel Sheldon guilty of two child pornography 
offenses. Little about Sheldon was sympathetic. In his twenties and 
married, Sheldon spent long hours downloading and viewing pictures and 
videos showing minor girls, some prepubescent, engaging in sex with 
adults. Some videos showed bondage, others masochism. Sheldon had 
also engaged in cybersex with individuals who purported to be young 
girls. 
 
What punishment should follow such a crime? If society punishes in order 
to stand with victims and impose justified retribution, what amount of 
deserts is just? No easy calculus exists. Because I was unsure that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines accurately mirror community punishment 
beliefs, I asked each of the Sheldon jurors—who were a cross-section of 
the community and who actually heard the case, saw the terrible images 
and videos, and met the defendant—to recommend anonymously what 
punishment Sheldon should receive. I put their responses away without 
examining them. Months later, I sentenced Sheldon within the Guidelines 
range, but near the high end. Surprise came upon learning that my 
sentence was almost five times higher than the average of the jurors’ 
sentence recommendations.88 
Lacking a connection to community values, § 2G2.2 is abhorrent to federal 
judges who strive to impose just punishments.89 Such judges frequently decline to 
apply the Guidelines, causing inconsistency in sentencing. A basic tenet of criminal 
punishment is that the only penalty that is justifiable is one proportional to the crime 
committed in manner and degree.90 Ius talionis, as Kant explained, is a principle of 
equality that does the work of “the needle on the scale of justice.”91 Judge Gwin’s 
study suggests that the Guidelines overstate society’s demand for punishment.92 Such 
a concept is directly contrary to the honest system of punishment that the Sentencing 
Reform Act hoped to achieve. 
In addition to lacking a connection to community values, the non-production 
Guidelines leave little room for rehabilitation.  While it is questionable as to whether 
imprisonment is appropriate in the context of child pornography offenses, there is 
little doubt that therapy is effective in treating sex offenders. In the United States, the 
criminal justice system manages most convicted sex offenders with imprisonment, 
                                                          
 88  Id. at 173 (emphasis added). 
 89  Id. at 175. 
 90  Sarah Holtman, Kant, Retributivism, and Civic Respect, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON 
THEORY AND POLICY 107, 108 (Mark White ed., 2011).   
 91  Id. at 109; see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, Some Second Thoughts on Retributivism, in 
RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 93, 96 (Mark White ed., 2011). 
 92  Gwin, supra note 7, at 183. 
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community supervision, specialized treatment or therapy, or a combination thereof.93 
Despite efforts to reform offenders into more productive members of society, there is 
a high rate of recidivism associated with some sex offenses.94 Nevertheless, it is 
generally accepted that rehabilitation has a positive effect on sex offenders, 
including child pornography non-production defendants.95 A recent study based on 
semi-structured interviews with child pornography offenders revealed that they only 
began to accept responsibility for their crimes when they undertook treatment.96 
Until they were required to confront their demons and consider the consequences of 
their actions, the offenders minimized the severity of their crimes.97 In fact, several 
participants indicated that they did not pose a “danger to children” and distanced 
themselves from the status of “sex offender.”98 Before treatment, such offenders 
construed looking at and downloading images as a private endeavor that did not 
imply any knowledge of or contact with the children depicted.99 After intensive 
rehabilitation, however, the offenders identified the victims of child pornography 
and discovered that the children in the images they downloaded were real.100 To 
these offenders, the possession of child pornography was no longer a victimless 
crime. 
This study is not an anomaly—it is widely accepted that treatment has proven 
effective in this realm.101 Accordingly, the Commission has attempted to integrate 
rehabilitation into federal sentencing law by recommending psycho-sexual treatment 
for all child pornography offenders.102 However, the existing programs are 
insufficient in a number of ways. First, treatment is often a condition of supervised 
release rather than a comprehensive form of rehabilitation that is implemented into a 
prison sentence.103 Treatment that is too remote in time allows offenders to further 
                                                          
 93  See Sheehan, supra note 35, at 813 (citing FAY HONEY KNOPP ET AL., NATIONWIDE 
SURVEY OF JUVENILE AND ADULT SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS AND MODELS 
(1992)). 
 94  Id. Recidivism describes the tendency of sex offenders to reoffend even after they have 
been convicted and served out any sentence. Id. 
 95  See generally Belinda Winder & Brendan Gough, “I Never Touched Anybody—That’s 
My 
Defence”: A Qualitative Analysis of Internet Sex Offender Accounts, 16 J. SEXUAL 
AGGRESSION 125 (2010). 
 96  Id. at 136. 
 97  Id. at 137. 
 98  Id. at 133. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. at 136–37. 
 101  See Sex Offender Treatment in the Context of Supervision: Effectiveness of Sex 
Offender Treatment (“Review of the Research”), CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., 
http://www.csom.org/train/supervision/long/04_02_02.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
 102  See USSG § 5D1.3(d)(7)(A) (requiring child pornography offenders to “participate in a 
program . . . for the treatment and monitoring of sex offenders” while on supervised release). 
 103  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Post-Conviction Issues in Child Pornography Cases, in 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 271, 271–74 (2012). 
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distance themselves from their crimes.104 In addition, the existing Bureau of Prisons 
Sex Offender Programs105 require several eligibility criteria and are only offered at 
designated institutions, making the programs difficult to enter for some low-level 
offenders.106 In fact, one such criterion requires that offenders volunteer to 
participate.107 Because sex offenders often experience denial with respect to their 
crimes,108 they are highly unlikely to enter such programs of their own free will. 
Thus, the Commission’s attempt to integrate rehabilitation into federal sentencing 
law ultimately has failed. 
Finally, as previously indicated, the non-production Guidelines are entirely too 
harsh.  According to a survey conducted by the Commission, most federal judges 
think child pornography sentences are too long.109 This problem is particularly 
disturbing with respect to non-production offenses, which include the simple 
possession of pornographic images of children.110 The Commission’s survey 
indicates that approximately 70% of judges think that the sentences for possession of 
child pornography are too high.111 The fact that most federal judges feel this way is 
unsettling. In addition, the child pornography Guidelines contain a laundry list of 
sentencing enhancements that significantly increase an offender’s punishment.112 
Although these enhancements reflect Congress’s sentiment that the possession of 
child pornography is a serious crime, they have the adverse effect of creating an 
unpredictable sentencing system.113 Taken together, the problems associated with the 
Guidelines provide judges with ample opportunity to deviate from the Commission’s 
flawed sentencing ranges. As a result of these deviations, retributive and utilitarian 
goals are defeated. 
B. The Retributive and Utilitarian Failures Caused by Inconsistent Punishment 
1. Retributive Failures as Demonstrated by Sixth Circuit Case Law 
The inconsistent punishment that results from the Guidelines’ inadequacies is 
detrimental to retributive goals. Undoubtedly, punishment is not “equal” when 
                                                          
 104  See generally Winder & Gough, supra note 95 (discussing the tendency of sex 
offenders to detach themselves from their crimes and distance themselves from the title of 
“sex offender”). Before receiving treatment, sex offenders refused to acknowledge the 
seriousness of their crimes. Id. In addition, child pornography non-contact offenders saw their 
crimes as victimless. Id. Only after treatment did the offenders orientate themselves to their 
crimes and take responsibility for their actions. Id. 
 105  For a general overview of the existing Bureau of Prisons Sex Offender Programs and 
treatment options, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5234.10, SEX 
OFFENDER PROGRAMS (2013). 
 106  Id. at 16. 
 107  Id. at 17 
 108  Winder & Gough, supra note 95, at 136–37. 
 109  An Introduction to Child Pornography Sentencing, supra note 39. 
 110  Id.   
 111  Id. 
 112  See USSG § 2G2.2. 
 113  See Rigsby, supra note 14, at 1345. 
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similarly situated offenders receive very different sentences—a blatant violation of 
retributivism’s focus on proportionality.114 The inequality in sentencing among non-
production offenders then creates a justice system in which valuable prosecutorial 
and judicial resources are wasted. In response to inconsistent punishments in child 
pornography cases, the U.S. Government has approached the Courts of Appeals in 
order to overturn unreasonable sentences.115 Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Booker, district courts, “while not bound to apply the 
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when 
sentencing.”116 Sentences imposed outside of the Guidelines range are reviewed for 
“reasonableness” at the appellate level.117 While a presumption of reasonableness 
applies to a sentence within the Guidelines, no such presumption applies to a 
variance.118 Thus, a sentence may be substantively unreasonable when it is arbitrary 
or based on impermissible factors.119 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, circuit courts are often confronted with substantively 
unreasonable sentences in child pornography cases. As a result, they must expend 
valuable judicial resources in an attempt to make punishment more consistent and 
predictable. This upsets society’s moral order and violates retributive principles. A 
recent Sixth Circuit decision exemplifies this issue. In United States v. Bistline,120 the 
defendant pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing 305 images and sixty-five videos 
of child pornography.121 Based on the seriousness of the offense and Bistline’s 
criminal history, his Guidelines range was sixty-three to seventy-eight months of 
imprisonment.122 At sentencing, the district court noted that the Guidelines for 
possession of child pornography were “seriously flawed.”123 In a significant 
downward departure from the Guidelines, the court announced its intention not to 
imprison Bistline at all, but instead to confine him overnight in a courthouse 
lockup.124 In vacating Bistline’s sentence, the Sixth Circuit emphasized the district 
court’s failure to punish based on the seriousness of the offense: 
The district court made a number of observations with respect to the 
seriousness of this offense. Many of them served to diminish it. The court 
did say that the images on Bistline’s computer were “horrendous,” and 
that the “production of child pornography and the distribution of it is an 
                                                          
 114  Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 347-48. 
 115  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). 
 116  Id.  
 117  Id. at 262. 
 118  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 355–56 (2007). 
 119  United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 120  United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 121  Id. at 760. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. The district court’s blatant acknowledgment of the Guidelines’ flaws suggests that 
the above factors played a role in the decision to deviate from the Guidelines. See supra Part 
III(A)(1). 
 124  Id. 
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extremely serious offense, one which should be punished accordingly.” 
But notably omitted from that recitation (and virtually unpunished in this 
case) was the crime of possession of child pornography . . . That the 
producers of child pornography are more culpable . . . does not mean that 
its knowing and deliberate possessors are barely culpable at all.125 
First, Bistline is precisely the type of case in which a deviation from the 
Guidelines was too lenient. While excessively harsh penalties do not serve 
retributive values, nor do those that are excessively lenient. For retributivists, 
proportionality is key to a successful criminal justice system.126 Importantly, Bistline 
also makes clear that several non-production offenders receive unpredictable 
punishments—a violation of the retributive principles on which the Guidelines are 
based. The Guidelines cannot promote the tenets of retributivism when the 
imposition of punishment is so arbitrary. 
The Sixth Circuit case of United States v. Robinson127 further demonstrates the 
issue posed for retributivism when judges arbitrarily deviate from the Guidelines. In 
Robinson, the Sixth Circuit held that a district court’s major departure from the 
Guidelines was substantively unreasonable.128  Robinson, who pleaded guilty to one 
count of possession of child pornography, subscribed to an online website and 
accessed over 7,100 images of pornographic material.129 A significant amount of the 
material—which Robinson obtained with a credit card payment—involved the 
bondage, torture, and rape of prepubescent children.130 Despite the fact that Robinson 
had no significant criminal record and scored a Criminal History Category I, several 
factors significantly enhanced his offense level, placing him within a Guidelines 
range of seventy-eight to ninety-seven months of imprisonment.131 However, based 
on a number of psychological evaluations and the conclusion that Robinson was not 
a “pedophile,” the district court sentenced him to one day of imprisonment, followed 
by a five-year period of supervised release.132 In justifying its downward variance, 
the district court made a number of considerations: 
The district court placed substantial weight on Robinson’s psychological 
evaluation, interpreting [a doctor’s] report to conclude that Robinson was 
not dangerous and not a pedophile. Relying heavily on that conclusion, 
the district court judge made the following statements: “[h]e does not 
render any recidivism factors for future behavior with children,” “I’m 
convinced you’re not going to do that again,” “[a]nd therefore, I am 
comfortable in varying to the degree that I’m varying.”133 
                                                          
 125  Id. at 764–65. 
 126  Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 347-48 (detailing the justifications of punishment). 
 127  United States v. Robinson, 669 F.3d 767, 775 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. at 769. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. at 769-70. 
 132  Id. at 771–72. 
 133  Id. at 775. 
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In vacating Robinson’s sentence, the Sixth Circuit noted that young children 
were raped in order to enable the production of the pornography that the defendant 
accessed.134 Despite the district court’s conclusions, this was a serious and 
horrendous crime. In addition, Robinson knowingly acquired the images 
affirmatively, deliberately, and repeatedly, hundreds of times over the course of five 
years.135 Thus, the characterization of “not dangerous and not a pedophile” was 
somewhat questionable.136 In light of the seriousness of the offense—a retributivist 
consideration—a mere day of imprisonment was not sufficient.137 In this instance, 
the flaws associated with the Guidelines caused yet another lenient punishment that 
was inappropriate under the circumstances. 
2. The Utilitarian Failures of the Child Pornography Guidelines 
In addition to failing to promote “just punishment,”138 the Guidelines do little to 
further utilitarian goals as a result of their inconsistent application. In promulgating 
the Guidelines, the Commission acknowledges deterrence as one of the “basic 
purposes of criminal punishment.”139 From a utilitarian perspective, the only 
justifiable system of punishment is one that brings about the greatest net benefit to 
society in terms of deterring criminals from future undesirable conduct and creating 
happier, more useful citizens.140 In an effort to reap such a benefit, Congress has 
demonstrated that deterrence is particularly important in child pornography 
sentencing. With the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Congress intended the 
Department of Justice to “dedicate the full force of [the] nation’s resources against 
those who victimize [the] nation’s youth.”141 The PROTECT Act increased penalties 
                                                          
 134  Id. at 777. 
 135  Id. at 776. 
 136  Id. at 775. 
 137  Id. at 776. 
 138  USSG Ch.5, Pt.A, intro.  
 139  Id. 
 140  See Michael, supra note 61, at 174. 
 141  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 03-266, FACT SHEET: PROTECT ACT (2003) (describing the 
PROTECT Act and its general goals); see also Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to 
End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 513(c), 117 Stat. 
650 (2003). The Department of Justice sets forth several remedies to address the sexual 
exploitation of children in the U.S., including: 
Increased penalties for non-family member child abduction:  the minimum prison 
sentence is now 20 years. 
 
Increased penalties for sexual exploitation of children and child pornography:  a first 
offense of using a child to produce child pornography is now 15 to 30 years. 
 
“Two Strikes” provision that requires life imprisonment for offenders who commit 
two serious sexual abuse offenses against a child. 
 
Provisions to address the rates of “downward departures”—when judges sentence 
criminal defendants to less time in jail than the Sentencing Guidelines state. 
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for child pornography and created provisions to address downward departures in 
possession cases.142 
Nevertheless, the current state of the Guidelines has defeated the purpose of such 
legislation. Deterrence is impossible when the sentences for non-production offenses 
have become increasingly inconsistent. For centuries, researchers have studied the 
effectiveness of criminal deterrence. This research indicates that deterrence is only 
effective when punishment is certain and predictable.143 Thus, it is a basic 
fundamental principle of the theory that without consistency in punishment, 
criminals will continue to take their chances by participating in undesirable 
conduct.144 In an early text on deterrence theory, philosopher Cesare Beccaria 
explained: 
One of the greatest curbs on crimes is not the cruelty of punishments, but 
their infallibility . . . The certainty of a punishment, even if it be moderate, 
will always make a stronger impression than the fear of another which is 
more terrible but combined with the hope of impunity; even the least 
evils, when they are certain, always terrify men’s minds.145 
Along with other deterrence theorists, Beccaria’s position was that the self-
interest to commit crimes must be thwarted by punishment that is certain, 
proportional, and swift.146 In fact, studies have shown that the perception of legal 
sanctions acts as at least a moderate deterrent to crime.147 
The Sixth Circuit cases of Bistline and Robinson indicate that non-production 
sentences are neither certain nor proportional.148 Because the Guidelines are no 
longer mandatory under the Booker regime,149 offenders cannot accurately predict 
what type of punishment they will receive.  In Bistline, for instance, the district court 
                                                                                                                                         
Id. The Department also advocated for provisions that would allow a term of supervised 
release of any terms of years or for life. Id. 
 142  Id.; see also United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 347 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting 
Congress’s view that “child pornography crimes are serious offenses deserving serious 
sanctions”) (internal punctuation omitted).  
 143  See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 58 (Henry Paolucci trans., 
Macmillan 1986) (1764). 
 144  Id.; see also JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 5 (1975) 
(discussing three key hypotheses that guide deterrence research in the criminal justice system, 
including certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment). 
 145  BECCARIA, supra note 143, at 58. 
 146  Id. at 46–47; see also Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About 
Criminal Deterrence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 769 (2010) (discussing various 
approaches to deterrence theory and the overall effectiveness of criminal deterrence). 
 147  See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the 
Twenty-First Century, in 23 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry ed., 
1998). 
 148  See United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Robinson, 669 F.3d 767, 775 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 149  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). 
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ordered the defendant to a mere night of confinement in the courthouse lockup.150 
While the sentencing range in Bistline was sixty-three to seventy-eight months of 
imprisonment, the court deviated from the Guidelines in an unpredictable exercise of 
judicial discretion.151 In the absence of consistent punishment, the Guidelines cannot 
serve the utilitarian purpose of deterrence. Punishment on a case-by-case basis—an 
attempt at individual deterrence—leads to disparities in sentencing and creates 
unpredictability.152 Because district court judges frequently depart from the 
Guidelines, two similarly situated defendants often receive markedly different 
sentences, notwithstanding the similarity of their crimes.153 While Congress 
attempted to resolve the disparity in federal sentencing law with the Sentencing 
Reform Act, these measures have proven ineffective. 
Ultimately, the inconsistent application of the Guidelines fails to promote both 
the utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment, leaving child pornography 
sentencing law in a state of limbo. Although the Guidelines have been subject to a 
great deal of criticism, Congress and the Commission have yet to revise them in a 
way that will promote consistency. While the Commission often revisits the 
Guidelines in light of sentencing data,154 it has failed to utilize that data in a 
productive manner. In light of the aforementioned failures, a systematic reform of 
the Guidelines is necessary.   
IV. A SYSTEMATIC REFORM OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY NON-PRODUCTION 
GUIDELINES 
For years, federal judges, legal scholars, and criminal defendants have urged the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission to reevaluate § 2G2.2 of the Guidelines. In fact, § 
2G2.2 has become one of the most litigated and least followed Guidelines in the 
federal sentencing system.155 Despite their failures, however, the Guidelines are still 
relevant. They should not be abolished, as they have the potential—if applied 
consistently—to achieve the goals of legislation like the PROTECT Act. 
Nevertheless, the current state of federal sentencing law is too inconsistent to serve a 
purpose. Thus, the time has come for Congress to modify the Guidelines in a way 
that will motivate district courts to adhere to them.  
                                                          
 150  Bistline, 665 F.3d at 760; see also Robinson, 669 F.3d at 775. 
 151  Bistline, 665 F.3d at 760. 
 152  See Gwin, supra note 7, at 183. Judge Gwin explains: 
Second, any emphasis on purposes other than retribution increases disparities. If 
individual deterrence becomes central, two defendants may receive markedly different 
sentences though their crimes and the resulting harm are nearly identical. Similarly, if 
incapacitation or rehabilitation becomes important, disparities result whenever similar 
criminals are seen as having different likelihoods for re-offense. 
Id. 
 153  Id. 
 154  USSG Ch.5, Pt.A, intro.  
 155  Stabenow, supra note 38, at 114. 
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/8
2017] PUNISHMENT WITHOUT PURPOSE 253 
 
A. Revision of the Guidelines Based on Jury Sampling 
1. Implementing Jury Sampling Practices in District Courts 
There are a number of ways to restore consistency to child pornography 
sentencing practices. The first entails a simple revision of § 2G2.2 based on society’s 
notion of just punishment. Many deviations from the Guidelines can be attributed to 
their lack of connection to community values. As Judge Gwin explains, community 
sentiment must be an important part of any just system of sentencing.156 Sentencing 
that lacks a connection to community values results in public misunderstanding of 
the seriousness of criminal conduct, undermines the law’s moral standing, and 
diminishes the criminal law’s normative force.157 Moreover, Judge Gwin explains, 
the marked disparity between the Guidelines and community values invites evasion 
by federal judges.158 In light of these issues, Judge Gwin suggests that the 
Commission methodically sample juror sentiments regarding appropriate 
punishment.159 Judge Gwin’s model aims to establish such a practice by 
incorporating juror sentencing recommendations into district courts’ reports to the 
Commission:   
The Sentencing Commission could easily ask trial courts to sample jurors 
who return guilty verdicts. Each sampling would take less than five 
minutes. District courts already report sentencing decisions to the 
Sentencing Commission. These reports could easily incorporate juror 
sentencing recommendations. The Commission currently assembles 
information that allows it to state the number, the mean and the median 
sentence for any crime, any offense level for that crime, and any criminal 
history category for that crime. The collection of juror sampling would 
pose only a minor additional task.160 
Without question, implementing jury sampling practices would provide insight 
into community values regarding appropriate punishment for child pornography 
offenders.161 In fact, the Sixth Circuit recognized the validity of Judge Gwin’s jury 
polling practice on appeal in United States v. Collins.162 The Commission should use 
the values obtained from jury sampling practices to thereafter revise the Guidelines.   
                                                          
 156  Gwin, supra note 7, at 175. See generally PETER H. ROSSI AND RICHARD A. BERK, JUST 
PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED (1997) (evaluating the 
degree of public consensus around the newly-enacted Guidelines). 
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. (emphasis added). 
 159  Id. at 194–95. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Id.  
 162  United States v. Collins, Nos. 15-3263/3309, 2016 WL 3583999, at *2 (6th Cir. June 
29, 2016) (noting that juries “can provide insight into the community's view of the gravity of 
an offense”). 
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2. Utilizing Jury Sampling Data to Revise the Guidelines 
As previously discussed, another common criticism of § 2G2.2 is that its 
sentencing ranges are excessively harsh. It is likely that jury sampling will reflect 
that sentiment, as it did in the Collins case. If so, the Commission can alleviate the 
harshness of the Guidelines by eliminating several of the existing sentencing 
enhancements under § 2G2.2.  Perhaps the most controversial and litigated 
enhancement is the “use of a computer” enhancement, which increases a defendant’s 
offense level by two if the conduct involved the use of a computer.163 Not 
surprisingly, over 95% of child pornography offenders use a computer to view, 
download, or distribute explicit materials.164 Although the use of technology allows 
offenders to duplicate, distribute, and access child pornography quickly and easily, 
the computer enhancement has several flaws. First, the enhancement does not 
distinguish between defendants who view one image on a computer and those who 
distribute child pornography to a mass number of subscribers.165 Second, with the 
widespread use of computers in modern society, the enhancement is essentially part-
and-parcel with the offense.166 Moreover, empirical data does not show that the use 
of a computer as a means to possess pornography is a “more serious or culpable 
offense” than viewing the images through another medium.167 In a way, this 
enhancement is somewhat arbitrary. The elimination of the computer use 
enhancement would reduce virtually every child pornography non-production 
offender’s sentencing range by at least two offense level points. 
Undoubtedly, § 2G2.2 must reflect the seriousness of the crime of child 
pornography. Child pornography is not a victimless crime,168 and offenders must be 
punished accordingly. The Commission must, however, ensure the consistent 
application of the Guidelines. After modifying the Guidelines based on jury 
sampling, the new sentencing ranges will be proportionate to the crime and 
                                                          
 163  USSG § 2G2.2(b)(6). The relevant provision provides a two-level increase if “the 
offense involved the use of a computer or an interactive computer service for the possession, 
transmission, receipt, or distribution of the material, or for accessing with intent to view the 
material.” Id. 
 164  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, USE OF GUIDELINES AND SPECIFIC OFFENSE 
CHARACTERISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 2010 37 (2010), 
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Guideline_Applicatio
n_Frequencies/2010/10_glinexgline.pdf. 
 165  Stabenow, supra note 38, at 122. 
 166  Id.; see also United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (E.D. Wis. 2008) 
(discussing the universal applicability of the “use of a computer” enhancement). 
 167  Stabenow, supra note 38, at 122 (quoting United States v. Tapp, No. 1:09-CR-123-
TLS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115051, 2010 WL 4386523, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2010)). 
 168  For a general discussion of the victims of child pornography and restitution issues in 
federal sentencing law, see 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (1996) (requiring the defendant to pay restitution 
for the “full amount of the victim’s losses” in child sexual exploitation cases); Audrey Rogers, 
Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847 (2008); Emily Bazelon, How 
Much Can Restitution Help Victims of Child Pornography?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/magazine/how-much-can-restitution-help-victims-of-
child-pornography.html?_r=0. 
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inherently more fair. Therefore, district court judges will inevitably be more likely to 
adhere to them—restoring consistency to the system. 
3. Potential Issues Associated With Judge Gwin’s Jury Sampling Proposal 
A set of Sentencing Guidelines based on community values seems inherently 
more fair. In fact, community values drive many aspects of both retributivism and 
utilitarianism. However, a jury sampling proposal has one potential flaw. 
Undoubtedly, “community values” vary across geographic regions of the United 
States. For instance, values among jurors from highly-populated, urban communities 
may be significantly different from values among jurors from rural regions. A 
difference in culture, upbringing, and education of jurors may affect suggested 
sentences in child pornography cases. In turn, the samples’ reliability would be 
jeopardized, and the Commission’s statistical analysis would become increasingly 
complicated. Judge Gwin recognizes that the Commission currently “assembles 
information that allows it to state the number, the mean and the median sentence for 
any crime, any offense level for that crime, and any criminal history category for that 
crime.”169 However, because of potential outliers, the mean sentence recommended 
by juries across the United States may not be entirely accurate.   
Despite these issues, jury sampling will—at the very least—provide insight into 
the revision process. While it may not be a panacea to the issues associated with the 
Guidelines, sampling will likely assist the Commission in developing a more 
uniform system of punishment and eliminating harshness from the Guidelines. As 
Judge Gwin suggests, jury sampling could “provide meaningful insight regarding 
society's beliefs about just punishments, and could remedy the lack of moral 
parallelism between community values and democratic system outcomes evidenced 
by the jury study.”170 Thus, jury sampling will allow the Commission to “take 
measure of important community beliefs” in various regions throughout the 
country.171 Perhaps the Commission should take into consideration the zip codes of 
jurors in processing jury polling information. Consequently, the information factored 
into the new set of Guidelines would be slightly more uniform, and the jury 
sampling system would reflect a wide range of backgrounds, cultures, and 
ideological viewpoints. 
B. Tempered Discretion Approach to the Guidelines 
An alternative solution is for district courts to simply utilize their discretion to 
vary from the Guidelines sparingly.172 Greater adherence to the Guidelines would 
                                                          
 169  Gwin, supra note 7, at 194. 
 170  Id. at 175–76. 
 171  Id. at 176. 
 172  Cf. Daniel A. Chatham, Playing with Post-Booker Fire: The Dangers of Increased 
Judicial Discretion in Federal White Collar Sentencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619, 638 (2007) 
(discussing the “tempered discretion” approach to the Guidelines in the context of white collar 
crimes). The tempered discretion approach is a viable alternative to Judge Gwin’s jury 
sampling proposal. In fact, tempered discretion in applying the Guidelines would provide for a 
significant increase in consistency in federal sentencing law. Chatham explains that “[b]y 
applying the guidelines largely in the same fashion as before Booker, federal judges dictate the 
best possible outcome for all actors in the game and avoid painting themselves into a 
mandatory minimum corner.” Id. 
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
256 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:231 
 
increase consistency, offer predictability for criminal defendants, and better serve 
retributive and utilitarian goals.173 The tempered discretion approach—although 
perhaps controversial—is slightly more predictable than the jury sampling proposal. 
This model would be similar to the pre-Booker regime of the Guidelines in which 
sentencing ranges were mandatory and punished defendants swiftly, proportionally, 
and certainly.174 Through tempered discretion, district courts can ensure that 
punishments will be consistent. Rather than impose sentences on a case-by-case 
basis, district courts might defer to the Commission and exercise judicial discretion 
in limited situations. Such punishment would be more aligned with what Congress 
intended when it first envisioned the Guidelines. Furthermore, consistent punishment 
will promote retributive and utilitarian goals and achieve the honest criminal justice 
system intended by the Sentencing Reform Act. 
C. Research, Rehabilitation, and the Dangers of Civil Commitment in Child 
Pornography Non-Production Offenses 
Finally, a comprehensive solution requires further research. As previously 
indicated, it is widely accepted that treatment has proven effective for child 
pornography offenders.175 However, the current Bureau of Prisons treatment 
programs are largely ineffective, as they focus on post-release supervision rather 
than in-prison treatment.176 Furthermore, the Bureau of Prisons programs involve 
eligibility criteria that are difficult for many offenders to satisfy.177 Thus, in 
conjunction with the Commission, the Bureau of Prisons must implement an 
effective and accessible rehabilitation program. The Guidelines should require 
mandatory participation in this program for the most severe child pornography 
offenses—which, in circumstances of extreme volume and material, may include the 
simple possession of child pornography. The Guidelines must shift their focus from 
punishment and blameworthiness to rehabilitation and treatment. While this will 
likely decrease recidivism among offenders, it will also promote utilitarian values by 
providing a greater net benefit to society. 
It would be highly beneficial to implement some type of rehabilitation or 
treatment program into federal sentencing law. However, the Commission and 
Bureau must be aware of the potential dangers associated with civil commitment in 
the context of child pornography offenses.178 For sex offenders, civil commitment 
may not be the best option for rehabilitation. As opposed to the terms of 
incarceration now imposed in child pornography cases, civil commitment is 
indefinite and depends wholly on an offender’s recovery.179 Such confinement would 
                                                          
 173  See Rigsby, supra note 14, at 1346.  
 174  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).   
 175  See generally Sex Offender Treatment in the Context of Supervision, supra note 101. 
 176  SEX OFFENDER PROGRAMS, supra note 105, at 16. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Civil commitment is defined as a “court-ordered commitment of a person who is ill, 
incompetent, drug-addicted, or the like, as contrasted with a criminal sentence.” Civil 
Commitment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Unlike a criminal commitment, the 
length of a civil commitment is indefinite because it depends on the offender’s recovery. Id. 
 179  Id. 
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be even more unpredictable than inconsistent district court sentences because 
“[u]nder civil commitment the state can hold a person for an undetermined length of 
time until its therapy works to the satisfaction of law enforcement agents.”180 This 
concept is particularly troubling with respect to young offenders, who have the 
potential to spend the rest of their lives in confinement. The civil commitment 
process in the United States must be reformed before it will be a viable solution for 
child pornography offenders. In fact, very few states make use of civil commitment 
due to its potential dangers.181 Until there is a thorough reform of the existing civil 
commitment programs, implementing a treatment program alongside traditional 
incarceration is likely the best choice for lawmakers. 
It should be noted that there is still some debate among prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, judges, and researchers as to whether child pornography offenders are 
more likely to commit contact crimes upon their release.182 Researchers have studied 
the characteristics, motivations, and sexual deviancy of offenders—including the 
effect of treatment on these traits.183 Based on these studies, psychologists have 
speculated for decades as to whether there is a correlative relationship between child 
pornography and pedophilia.184 The fact of the matter is, however, that we may not 
know enough about the psychology of child pornography offenders to implement a 
truly comprehensive solution. Future research, including in-depth interviews with 
child pornography offenders, must delve into factors such as the type of offense, type 
and severity of material, offender’s childhood characteristics, and offender’s 
pedophilic interest.185 Insight into pedophilia and its relationship with child 
pornography offending “may be helpful in treatment to counteract and prevent 
reoffending.”186 Only when we have more thorough and accurate data regarding 
child pornography offenders will we truly have the ability to systematically reform 
the Guidelines. 
V. CONCLUSION: NEED FOR REFORM TO PREVENT THE SEXUAL  
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN 
It is clear that the U.S. criminal justice system is in need of sentencing reform. 
Despite the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the child pornography non-
production Guidelines have failed to promote the basic purposes of criminal 
                                                          
 180  James Ridgeway, How ‘Civil Commitment’ Enables Indefinite Detention of Sex 
Offenders, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/26/civil-commitment-sex-offenders 
(discussing the dangers of confining sex offenders indefinitely, particularly in the case of 
young offenders). 
 181  Id. 
 182  See generally Jenny A.B.M. Houtepen et al., From Child Pornography Offending to 
Child Sexual Abuse: A Review of Child Pornography Offender Characteristics and Risks for 
Cross-Over, 19 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 466 (2014). 
 183  See id. 
 184  See id. 
 185  Id. at 472. 
 186  Id. 
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punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.187 
Because of the problems associated with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2G2.2—
including lack of connection to community values, failure to offer rehabilitation, and 
harshness—district courts show little deference to the Guidelines. In fact, it seems 
that district court judges choose to deviate from the Guidelines range quite often. As 
a result, child pornography offenders receive inconsistent and unpredictable 
sentences that do not promote the theories of punishment recognized by the United 
States.   
Child pornography is a serious crime, and the U.S. justice system should make 
every effort to prevent the sexual exploitation of children. Thus, the Commission 
must restore consistency to the system. There are a number of ways to accomplish 
this. First, district courts should implement jury sampling practices into child 
pornography cases. Jury sampling will shed light on the community’s notion of just 
punishment. Based on this insight, the Commission should then revise the 
Guidelines accordingly. Alternatively, district courts could exercise tempered 
discretion with respect to the child pornography Guidelines. Although Booker allows 
district courts discretion in departing from the Guidelines, the 2005 landmark 
decision has arguably worsened the unpredictability and inconsistency in federal 
sentencing law. By exercising tempered discretion, federal judges can ensure that 
offenders receive the punishment that the Commission—and Congress—intended.   
Finally, further research into the psychology of child pornography offenders is 
necessary. Qualitative research regarding sexual preferences, childhood 
characteristics, and coping strategies of offenders will provide insight into the field 
and help psychologists and lawmakers in treatment planning.188 The Commission 
and the Bureau of Prisons can then implement an effective and accessible 
rehabilitation program. Such a program will serve utilitarian values and provide a 
greater net benefit to society. 
These measures will increase consistency in federal sentencing law, which—in 
turn—will better promote retributive and utilitarian goals. Congress has made clear 
the importance of deterring child pornography crimes—they pose a great threat to 
our children and result in harm to everyone involved. However, attempts to protect 
children from sexual exploitation are thwarted when retributive and utilitarian goals 
are futile. Only when the Guidelines truly reflect the retributive and utilitarian values 
that our country recognizes can they help protect the nation’s youth from sexual 
exploitation. In a criminal justice system in which purpose reaps benefits, the 
Guidelines cannot continue to punish child pornography offenders without it.   
                                                          
 187  USSG Ch.5, Pt.A, intro.  
 188  Houtepen et al., supra note 182, at 472. 
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